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Long live dangerous thinking: or, 
becoming infected by the 'thinginess' of 
the social 
'There is a direct relationship between the greatness of an author and the danger of 
the material he handles. It is not the task of a writer to be harmless. Harmlessness 
only begets harmlessness, but danger gives rise to imaginative thought (...). A good 
writer is infected by the material he works with - there is no way around this. 
Thomas Mann did this, Franz Kafka, Robert Musil ... all the great writers of this 
century. They were all masters of dangerous thinking.' (Peter Sloterdijk, 
Selbstversuch, 1996: 121; my translation) 
Gerard Verschoor 
Multiform. Diversified. Inimitable. If a single word could capture the wide range 
of work published by Norman Long, then surely these terms would be serious 
contenders. For these words stand for what is probably the most central concern 
of his oeuvre: understanding how what he calls heterogeneity comes about. After 
over two decades at his side - both as student and colleague - it is hardly a 
surprise to find myself sharing this central interest with him. But we disagree on 
the terms in which to study diversity. Thus in this chapter I argue that Long's 
actor-oriented approach has misunderstood heterogeneity (that what holds the 
social together) for diversity (the outcome of bringing dissimilar and hitherto 
unrelated elements together). To make my point, I first outline the character of 
our disagreement and propose that this be so because, for the last decade, Long 
has not risked becoming infected by the flesh-and-blood actors who fill his 
books. I then go on to propose - by way of three short cases - that in becoming 
infected by what we work with, we can indeed say original and exiting things 
about variation and diversity. I close the chapter by suggesting that there is much 
to learn from the people we work with, as it is they who can eventually allow us 
to say 'dangerous' things about the object of sociology. 
An epistemological disagreement and a proposal 
Our world is a disordered place. It harbours a bewildering array of dissimilar 
elements running from the smallest molecule to the largest living organisms. 
Through the ages we have learned to group these elements together so as to bring 
about some sense of order in our universe. The Sciences have been crucial in this 
quest for classification. They have done so by associating hitherto unconnected 
elements with one another, carving out societies from chaos. Thus we have 
societies of living and non-living organisms (as in ecology), societies of forces 
(as in physics), societies of stars and solar systems (as in astronomy). 
Heterogeneity, or that 'composed of unrelated or differing parts or elements' 
(Collins English Dictionary), then, is the stuff from which the Sciences are made 
up. But there is one exception to this: the human sciences. As the name already 
discloses, these sciences effectively cross-out the different classes of elements 
with which humans may have an affair, and make one species - Man - the centre 
of the universe. In so far as other elements are allowed into the picture, these do 
so only as repositories of human meaning, or as means to achieve desired ends. 
This form of discrimination has been under fire for some 20 years now in the 
field of 'Science and Technology Studies' (henceforth STS). The message from 
STS - namely that one cannot understand Man without taking into account how 
he becomes entangled with the objects that surround him - has given rise to such 
lively debates lately that one of its main proponents, the French anthropologist 
Bruno Latour, has occupied the top position in the social science citation index 
for the last four years. Some of the ideas from STS have already been taken on 
board in Rural Sociology - witness the mushrooming of actor-network theory 
studies in this field - but, so far, the impact has not been felt in our own field of 
Development Sociology. Considering these events, we can do two things now. 
We can wait and see how the field develops (to find out, eventually, that others 
have overtaken us) or run the risk of saying something dangerous (an approach 
that rather becomes Wageningen Sociology). Protagonists of the latter would 
claim that the object of Development Sociology consists of the complex 
entanglements of people and things: in other words, the study of the hetero-
genus or of that, which, according to Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, 'consists 
of dissimilar or diverse ingredients or constituents.' 
Reclaiming dangerous thinking 
Science can be classified as being 'good' or 'bad' according to a set of agreed-
upon criteria. These criteria (which are always normative) come in different 
forms, the best known of which are Karl Popper's (e.g. 1961). Of late other, non-
Popperian criteria for 'good' or 'bad' science have been elaborated by the likes 
of Isabelle Stengers (1997), Michel Serres (1997), Donna Haraway (1989), Peter 
Sloterdijk (1996) or Bruno Latour (1993). The differences between the criteria 
are many, but for the purposes of this chapter I highlight the issue of just who is 
allowed to speak when we 'do' science. For Popper, it is clear that the scientist is 
in command, as the scientist 'still possesses the formidable privilege of raising 
the questions on his or her own terms' (Latour, 1999b: 7). From Popper's point 
of view, the theories of scientists may be falsifiable, but scientists nevertheless 
control the process of scientific investigation. Non-Popperian criteria for 'good' 
science, on the contrary, propose that scientists have to put themselves at risk by 
having the questions they are raising requalified by the entities put to the test 
{ibid. : 7). In other words, the issue is not one of designing questions that are 
most able to jeopardise a theory, but to ask oneself: 'Am I asking you the right 
questions? Am I sensitive to your resistance to my questions? Am I allowing you 
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to infect me?' In this essay I follow this non-Popperian criterion: science is 
'good' when it does not 'silence' its object. More positively, it is 'good' when it 
accepts the risk of providing its objects a voice so that these acquire an important 
say in the definition of what is problematic and what is not. 
Long and good science 
Norman Long has in the past produced various pieces of 'good' science that 
conform to this non-Popperian criterion. An example of this dates back to the 
mid-1970s, when he launched the exiting idea that, in the case of Central Sierra 
of Peru, capitalist expansion produced substantial growth in the non-enclave 
sector. This growth was accompanied, he suggested, by patterns of socio-
economic diversification and accumulation, especially in village-based trade and 
transport (Long, 1975; Long and Roberts, 1978; 1984). In addition, and contrary 
to views that claimed that the right tools to study these processes consisted of 
'macro' concepts (such as those of institutions, organisations or nations), Long 
proposed that interactional networks and normative frameworks were the most 
appropriate instruments to gain insight into the dynamics of development (Long, 
1972; 1979). 
What is important in the context of my argument is that Long was able to say 
these things because he had overcome the recalcitrance of the people he 
interacted with by learning to ask the right questions. This is an extraordinary 
feat for, in the social sciences, it is quite usual for a scientist to ask questions, 
flee to the safety of the academic setting, invent a story, and get away with it 
without the object objecting. But Long chose to give 'voice' to those he studied: 
it was the actors themselves who allowed him to posit the dangerous and 
provocative claim that underdevelopment does not follow automatically from 
capitalist development. Little by little, and through painstaking anthropological 
fieldwork, Long achieved some degree of familiarity with the people he studied, 
and in doing so came to see the utter implausibility of stories that were being 
imagined, far away, from the comfort of Western academic settings. Like music 
and drug lovers who are 'under the influence ' (cf. Gomart and Hennion, 1999) 
Long let 'external forces' take possession of him. Thus 'infected' by his object, 
he was finally 'forced' to modify his account of entrepreneurs and 'authorised' 
by them to forward the interesting, original but also 'dangerous' thesis that one 
does not move an inch in understanding the behaviour of entrepreneurs by 
sticking to 'grand theories' that are out of touch with empirical reality. 
Dangerous propositions kept on coming in Long's early Wageningen years. 
The ground breaking work on intervention situations culminating in the notion of 
interface (Long, 1989), for example, surpasses the non-Popperian criteria for 
good science outlined above hands down. But the times they are a-changin', as 
good old Dylan once put it. What was once daring may now be in dire need of 
overhauling. As Kuhn (1962) so convincingly showed 40 years ago, complex 
ideas snatch older ones, feed on them and eventually displace them to the 
garbage dump of history. Long's ideas - as brilliant as they were 20 years ago -
have lost much of their appeal as they become re-framed by a new generation of 
development sociologists sensitive to the conceptual evolution and paradigmatic 
shifts of an increasingly fragmented field of study. Indeed, Lyotardian 
postmodernism, Deleuzian poststructuralism, Lacanian psychoanalysis and 
Latourian actor-networks have fused with world-systems analysis, regulationist 
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studies, globalisation theories, political ecology, and postdevelopmentalism 
(Büttel 2001) and have changed forever the way in which one is 'authorised' to 
speak about the world, the Other, or oneself. 
These theoretical developments of course did not leave Long unaffected, and 
in fact provided the backdrop to a search for a more secure foundation for his 
explanations. Unfortunately, this move pushed him away from the field and into 
theory. As I have argued elsewhere (Verschoor, 1997), in doing so, Long chose 
to marry his original and fertile method with an eclectic array of ideas involving 
liberal and individualistic notions of agency à la Giddens (e.g. Long, 1992) and 
post-structuralist conceptualisations of knowledge and power. Embedding these 
three concepts in a model of strategic action that assumes humans to be selfish, 
rational, calculative beings who anticipate others' moves in order to pursue their 
advantage in conditions of scarcity (cf. Steins, 1999) led, throughout the mid 
1990s, to a double impasse. Firstly, the object of study was relocated from action 
to processes going on inside people's heads (such as shared values and 
meanings). The character of the problem this involves is perhaps best illustrated 
by the pop musician Matt Johnson (The The): 'How can anybody know me, if I 
can't even know myself...' Secondly, the actor in the actor-oriented approach 
was no longer the flesh-and-blood actor who had authorised Long to say 
interesting things about him: he had become a model of the actor. In other words, 
Long's approach uses a discourse of 'actor-orientation' to bring a theoretical 
model of human behaviour into circulation - and not anymore to give 'voice' to 
real-life actors who are thus in effect 'silenced'. This, in my view, is a pity 
because of the potential of Long's unique ethnographic approach, which could 
(very easily and hands down!) become dangerous once more, by articulating for 
example with the ideas from the field of STS. To make my point, I present three 
abridged case studies below in which the thinginess of the social is shown to be 
all around us if we only have the eyes to see it. 
Conversations in Mezquitân: learning to do more things with 'things' 
Mezquitân, an ejido hidden in the folds of Mexico's Sierra Madre forms the 
backdrop for the research I carried out in 1987 for my Masters' thesis. During 
my fieldwork period, I had the chance to live and work, on an on-and-off basis 
and for a period of about six months, with Saturnino, a reserved but resolute 
farmer with little means and then in his mid sixties. During this period I had the 
opportunity of taping some of our conversations which often focused on farming. 
In fact, farming was Saturnino's passion. As a rule, Saturnino was either at his 
field (where he sometimes slept), at home, or coming and going between them. 
He was, however, not the average farmer: that year, he had been the only one in 
Mezquitân and the neighbouring ejido of San Francisco to obtain a full maize 
harvest on non-irrigated land. This made him a very proud man, as according to 
local cultural standards a good farmer is supposed to obtain a good harvest, 
provided there are no natural disasters. In what follows I present an abridged and, 
for the sake of clarity, edited part of these conversations. I have left out most of 
my questioning and in-between comments, as this is neither the place nor the 
time to indulge in self-reference. The purpose of presenting the material in this 
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way is to provide an impression of the thinginess of agriculture, that is, of the 
things that make agriculture possible. 
On the timing of tasks 
The most important part of farming is probably timing: when to prepare the land, 
when to sow, when to weed or when to harvest in such way that one works with 
and not against the elements. As Saturnino told me: 
''Many things can influence the harvest. And if one is a good farmer, one ought to 
know these things. Listen, first of all one needs to know the state of the moon: some 
moons bring water, others don't. To know whether a moon has water or not one has 
to consult the moon calendar. For example, if it rains on the first day of the first 
moon of the year it will rain in the month of January. If it rains on the second day, 
then there will be water in February. If it rains on the fourth, it will rain in April. 
The important days to look for are the eighth and the ninth because they stand for 
August and September. If it rains on the eighth we're lucky, and we have to sow in 
May. If it rains on the ninth, it will rain in September and we have to sow in July... 
I'm interested in that calendar because it gives me life... For instance, this year's 
August moon was forecast to bring water, right? So I started sowing en seco [i.e. in 
May, before the rainy season proper]... When the August rains came, my maize was 
already producing its ears of grain... So the moon is telling you everything.' 
The moon calendar - and some specific days within it - thus sets the general 
parameters for the sowing date. But this remains too general. Saturnino: 
'Of course I would like to know the exact day on which to start sowing! But that's 
not always possible. On the day you want to sow, you have to go to the land and see 
if she will receive the seed that day. If the land is willing to receive the seed, then 
there is no web on the soil. But if you go out there in the morning and see that there 
are webs on your soil, it means you can't sow that day. That's a bad day... That day 
the sun, and not the moon, is making contact with the earth... If I sow that day, the 
maize will not develop a cob. It will only develop leaves. ' 
The sun and the moon, then, seemed to be important entities for they indicated 
the precise day that one could sow. This had implications for some of the 
economic decisions to be made, and even for the shape of Saturnino's network. 
For example, Saturnino used a tractor for deep-plowing, fallowing, harrowing 
and cultivating those parts of his land that were not too steep (there he would 
utilise a team of mares or a hoe). On those tracts of land where the tractor was 
used, Saturnino used to sharecrop with his neighbour Julian, who happened to 
own the only tractor in the direct vicinity. This amazed me because the price paid 
- sharecropping - was more expensive than renting a tractor when needed. When 
confronted with some figures, Saturnino replied: 
' Well with renting I would be better off. Of course! But listen, the important thing is to 
ensure that the work is done on time... I don't gain a thing by paying somebody for a 
tractor and him not being around when I need him. Valgo madrés! [I'd be worth 
nothing!]. We have to see things the way they are in life! Look, I've been to Autldn [a 
mid-sized city ten kilometres away] before to rent a tractor. I told the owner I wanted 
a tractor for sowing when then and then. He agreed, but when the day came, the son 
of a bitch said 'well you see, I can't come today. ' So what did I gain? Nothing: I was 
screwed because one day means a lot when you need to sow: if I can't sow on that 
particular day, I can forget about the whole business. It will be too late and the maize 
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will not thrive. So I tell you it's an advantage for me to sharecrop my land with 
Julian. If I tell him to do this or that, he does it. I can rely on him. ' 
On soil fertility 
Agriculture is impossible on an infertile soil. Therefore Saturnino took great care 
to reproduce the little fertility his poor soils were capable of carrying. Deep 
ploughing was essential here. In his words: 
'The most important thing about deep ploughing is that it exposes the broken up 
earth to the sun. The sun then starts burning the earth and breaking up the clods. 
This is called the salvia, which gives fertility to the soil. If you have salvia, you don't 
need a fertiliser... Many people come to me, even so-called engineers, and they say: 
"but, you don't use fertilisers?" No, I don't. I don't because it's not to my advantage! 
My land is thin, and I'm only going to impoverish it more by using chemicals. The 
land: beat it. I'll improve it by beating [i.e. working] it. The soil is like a woman: you 
have to beat her so she can produce! It just needs ploughing and leaving fallow on 
time. And sun. Let the land take her share of the sun. The sun has much to tell the 
land. I know these rules because I still have Indian blood in me. That's why one 
knows of these things. ' 
Experience was an important asset. Having seen multinational agricultural 
companies come (and leave) the fertile, irrigated lands close to Mezquitân only 
reinforced his passionate plea to conserve fertility through organic means only: 
' Commercial fertilisers are pure chemistry, and chemistry will just do for a few 
years. After a while the chemicals will ruin your soil. Just look at the tomato 
producers around here. They've been impoverishing their land with chemicals for 
years, and now they complain about plagues! For instance, that fly, the white fly. 
You have to fumigate it, no way out. It arrived some eight to ten years ago. It arrived 
with the chemistry I tell you! If you're giving your soil chemistry you're plaguing it. 
Do you follow me? And what do these tomato producers do? They apply more 
fertiliser! Stupidity! I tell you, this place is slowly going to hell! But they [the 
companies] can leave the land when it's finished. Not me! I have to stay...! I just sow 
what the soil will give. I don't throw anything on it... I work! For example, if there's 
a plague, the thing to do is to plough the land and sow beans. When the beans start 
flowering, it's just a matter of turning them over by ploughing once again so that the 
soil has a chance to make some iron. Because iron gives oxygen to the soil and the 
soil can breathe again. ' 
On plagues 
Saturnino emphasised the work that was needed to keep his soil fertile. He 
nevertheless let his compadre Carlos graze his cattle on the plot occasionally 
(and for a nominal fee) so Carlos' twenty cows could eat the maize stalks left 
behind and fertilise the soil with their dung. This was not devoid of problems, 
though: 
'The agreement is very convenient for me, because Carlos is paying me for material 
I don't need anymore [the stalks] and the cows are there fertilising the land. But 
then I need to have knowledge of how things are, right? Because, for instance, if a 
cow is manuring the soil, well that's manure alright, but it will only help me if I 
plough or leave the land fallow before sowing. Because a cow's dung contains 
mizticuil [a plague that eats the roots of the maize plant]. And when a cow steps on 
its dung, the dung will be buried and the sun won't get a chance to kill the plague. 
That's another reason why I always plough or leave the land fallow - to kill the 
mizticuil/' 
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Generally Saturnino was able to control most plagues successfully. He attributed 
this to his careful handling of the soil. A number of crop diseases, however, 
could not be fully controlled. Saturnino labelled these diseases chahuixtle, which 
came in black or yellow types: 
'The yellow one operates after it has rained and the maize is developing its cob. 
This phenomenon attaches itself to the plant, grows, eats from the cob and affects the 
yield ... The black chahuixtle is like falling ash. It operates when there's little or no 
rain. It's already working as soon as it touches the plant: it grasps the top of the cob 
and cook it right there! After a while the plant turns completely black. Even if it 
rains there's nothing to be done as the plant is already burned!' 
Here, again, the timing of tasks was crucial. As Saturnino explained: 
'I've had less trouble with these plagues than others have. That's because I closely 
observe the first days of the moon calendar. After the eight and ninth day have told 
me about the rains in August and September, I know whether to expect chahuixtle or 
not. If the rains are going to be poor I can expect the black chahuixtle to come. If 
good rains are predicted I need not worry about it. And if the rains are expected to 
be mediocre I can expect yellow chahuixtle. I know this because if, for instance, the 
morning of the eighth day of the first moon is overcast and the afternoon clear, it 
means it's only going to rain the first half of August. And if it rains that whole day 
then it will rain the whole month of August and there'll be no black chahuixtle... 
Some years I know the chahuixtle is coming anyway so then I better sow something 
other than maize!' 
On crop choice 
As the last sentence suggests, crop choice may be a function of diseases 
expected. In cases when maize could not be planted, sorghum was often the crop 
of choice. But here, too, things were not always so straightforward: 
'It's not too smart to have a crop of sorghum twice or thrice on the same place, 
because your fertility will go down and you'll need extra fertiliser. The sun will 
produce salvia anyway after the ploughing, but the problem is this: when you let the 
cattle in after the harvest, they will not produce enough manure. That's because 
sorghum has very short and fragile stalks and the cows will trample it and not eat it 
anymore. Maize is much better, because the stalks are resistant and tall so the cows 
will eat them all. You can never keep cattle on a sorghum plot as long as on a maize 
plot. With sorghum, your soil gets less manure... So maize is much better! But 
sometimes there is no way out and you have to sow sorghum anyway. For example, 
my son Pancho has his plot next to a piece of land rented out to a tomato company. 
So when these bloody tomato pickers come to harvest... if they can, they will steal 
half your maize harvest! They are from Michoacdn, Guerrero, Oaxaca. You can't 
trust them! Once you sow sorghum, the cutters can't steal it, because sorghum is for 
the cows. You can't eat it, right?' 
The conversations with Saturnino clearly overflow accounts in which the main 
role is laid aside for human actors only, and points to the heterogenous character 
of what we normally call 'the social'. Let us learn from this and embrace, with 
both arms, what the many Saturninos we engage with urge us to do: 'design your 
sociology in such way that it can accommodate all elements of action'. I return to 
this point in the last section of this chapter. 
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Tinkering with consumers: under the influence of mezcal 
I had the dubious pleasure of carrying out some research on the Mexican liquor 
industry in 1994. The location was the dormant township of Tolimân, lying under 
the smoke of a towering volcano some 100km east of Mezquitän. One of actors 
who featured in my work was León, a producer of mezcal (distilled liquor made 
from the heart of the agave plant and a generic name for its more infamous 
cousin, tequila). León, like many other distillers in the region, was desperately 
trying to work out how to enlarge his market share. In nearby hamlets 27 fellow 
producers were also pondering questions such as 'what means must I employ to 
enlarge my clientele?' or 'how can I can out-smart the competition?' 
Unfortunately - and this was at the root of the mezcal producer's worries - no 
straightforward recipe existed for enlarging market shares. This does not mean 
they were ploughing the dark with their minds only. All producers had, to a 
greater or lesser extent, a way to gauge 'what the market wants'. They were 
aware, for example, that the market has a topology of its own. Thus tequila is the 
undisputed king of the pile north of Guadalajara, while mezcal is hard to beat on 
its home turf to the south of the five million-plus megalopolis. Also, they knew 
from experience that yellowish mezcal aged in oak barrels does well in the 
nearby states of Colima and Michoacän, while white mezcal straight from the 
still is fancied in the vicinity of Guadalajara. Likewise, producers knew that sales 
go up in the post-harvest season (when farmers have plenty of cash) and during 
patron saint fiestas and rodeos - only to plummet in the spring and during the hot 
season when cold beer is highly preferred. In addition, producers were well 
aware of the way in which consumers classify the taste of mezcal. Thus the term 
vino is used to refer to cheaper, often down graded, types of mezcal while tequila 
refers to a mezcal obtained through a specific way of processing the main 
ingredients (and through which the end product loses its harsh, characteristic 
'woody' flavour). Finally, the term de olla designates a mezcal prepared in the 
traditional way. The qualities of this latter type of liquor are highly appreciated, 
and today prices for it are in the range of USD 25-250 per litre. 
In an ideal world, producers might be able to convince consumers to prefer 
their liquor to that of their competitors by offering their best mezcal, that is, de 
olla quality, for a reasonable price. In reality, however, this proves difficult 
because producers work for a profit and unfortunately for them, quality mezcal is 
scarce and therefore difficult to make a living from. From the perspective of the 
producers of Tolimân then, the closest thing to a recipe for success was to have 
one's mezcal resemble, as much as possible, 'ideal type', traditional de olla 
quality - and sell it at an affordable price. This meant that producers would 
advertise their premium mezcal as being made on the basis of mature agaves of 
the green or lineno variety, slowly cooked on wood in a traditional underground 
basin, fermented without any additives or artificial boosters, with an alcohol 
percentage of close to 50°GL and, depending on the region it was to be sold in, 
aged in barrels made from French oak. To corroborate this, consumers would 
look for specific traits. The liquor has be brownish in colour, make long-lasting 
bubbles when the bottle is shaken (any distilled spirits over 46° will do so), leave 
an 'oily' stain when in a glass, and have a slightly sweet but 'earthy' taste and a 
'smoky' odour. In their desire to conform to consumer ideas on quality, 
producers would sometimes turn to tinkering with the ingredients. They would 
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use glycerine, soap, almond essence or ammonium sulphate in the different 
phases of the production process so that the final product resembled what was 
expected of it. This however is a cat-and-mouse game because consumers could 
get wind of it (gossip travels quickly!) and turn their backs to a brand breaking 
the rules. These cat-and-mouse games (I prefer to call them 'knowledge 
encounters') drive the mezcal industry. Trying to be ahead of consumers and 
competitors, however, means that one has to go beyond the certainty of what is 
already 'known' (i.e. the topology of the market, the classification of taste) and 
venture into the dark: 'Will consumers accept my latest ruse? Will they like the 
changes I have made to my product? Will they be positively influenced by my 
new offer?' It is to this type of questions that I now turn. 
In 1991, for example, León ventured into unknown territory by increasing the 
output per unit of agave. This entailed substituting the local, 'green' variety of 
agave for so-called 'blue' agaves (used for the production of tequila) which have 
a much higher fermentable sugar/weight relation. The gains to be obtained were 
substantial: prices per kilogram of agave were almost the same, but whilst León 
needed 20 kilograms of 'green' agave to distil one litre of mezcal this same litre 
could be manufactured with 7-10 kilograms of the 'blue' variety. The crucial 
question was: Would his customers notice the somewhat 'softer' (but less 
appreciated) taste of the 'blue' variety? The consumers were not long in 
replying, punishing León by switching to other brands once they had discovered 
that his mezcal tasted like tequila (a 'bad' attribute for 'good' mezcal). León kept 
experimenting for a while with the ratio of varieties used but, after a lack of 
success, he aborted the strategy of increasing the input/output relation. 
A full year later, and after having recovered to previous sale levels, León tried 
out a new stratagem to increase the input/output relation. This time around, the 
trick consisted of shortening the fermentation time (which usually takes between 
8-10 days) by heating the fermentation tanks and increasing the temperature and 
speed at which the ferments converted sugars into alcohol. The new strategy 
however turned out to be self-defeating: as León soon realised, to decrease 
fermentation time in any noticeably way required a prohibitive amount of fossil 
fuel, thus making the final product more expensive - even though conforming to 
customer expectations. 
Two years later León gave it another try. Shortening the cooking time of the 
agaves was the name of the game this time as great gains were to be achieved on 
this front. Normally agaves are cooked in a series of time-consuming steps. First, 
wood is burnt inside a large basin (plia in Spanish, which is where quality 
mezcal derives its name from) some three meters deep and three meters across. 
Once the fire is going the wood is covered with a layer of fist-sized stones that 
absorb the heat. Then 2-3 tons of chopped-up agaves are placed on top of the 
stones and covered with a layer of earth to prevent air from coming into contact 
with them. After some 60-72 hours of 'cooking' the sour saps of the agave plants 
have converted into sugars (to be fermented at a later stage). The layer of earth is 
then removed and, after a day of cooling off, the agaves, stones and ash are taken 
out. The whole process, however, can easily be shortened and producers of 
tequila have been doing so for decades. The shorter method, which had recently 
been taken over by some mezcal producers in the region, consists of steam-
cooking the agaves in a so-called autoclave or caldera (a sealed chamber in 
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which vapour steam is injected from below). Because of the higher temperatures, 
the agaves only take 20-22 hours to hydrolyse. 
Although the initial equipment is expensive (a steam engine has to be 
purchased), the investment can in principle be recovered in a matter of months. 
The problem with this time-saving method (and this was common knowledge) 
was that, in the process, the taste of the mezcal is influenced because it no longer 
comes into contact with smoke and earth, thus losing its characteristic and highly 
appreciated 'earthy' and 'woody' taste and odour. Since León did not want to be 
thrown back to square one by having his mezcal taste like tequila he opted for an 
alternative: an increase in efficiency through an innovation in the cooking 
process. The innovation itself consisted of a brick and cement chamber that 
could hold 6-7 tons of agaves. These are brought into the chamber through a 
heavy, metal door sealing the chamber from the outside. Inside, tiles capable of 
withstanding high temperatures shield the chamber. In effect, the chamber is akin 
to the calderas of the tequila producers but what is innovative is that, underneath 
this chamber, there is another room containing stones that spread the heat 
generated by burning wood located on yet a lower level. Metal grids separate the 
three compartments to prevent the agaves from coming into direct contact with 
the stones, and the stones from falling onto the burning wood. The lower 
compartment is below surface level, and can be accessed through a stair that 
connects to a tunnel and a metal door. The innovation does not diminish cooking 
time, but is a revolution in terms of throughput as the whole process involves 
only two steps (as opposed to 8 steps in the 'traditional' set-up). Most 
importantly, agaves are still cooked on wood for 72 hours which means that the 
final product retains the 'woody' taste of premium mezcal 
As with the conversations in Mezquitân, what this condensed case makes 
abundantly clear is that any attempt to make sense of the knowledge encounters 
involving producers and consumers of mezcal must take into consideration the 
many non-human elements that are successively implicated in the story. What is 
referred to as the 'knowledge of the consumer' cannot be rendered precise 
without first understanding the role of things. I return to this issue in the last 
section. 
Borrowing support: learning to make bananas swell 
In the mid-1980's, Costa Rica's agriculture seemed to be grinding to a halt. The 
administration of President Arias provided a diagnosis for this in which the 
country's problematic situation was coupled, among other things, to high 
external debt, the collapse of the import-substitution model, technological 
backwardness, and the uncertain land ownership situation of the majority of 
smallholders. The administration also provided a solution to these problems by 
referring to a vocabulary of structural adjustment involving such disparate 
elements as open markets, non-traditional export crops, land-titling or eco-
tourism, heralding these as potential saviours of the Costa Rica's agricultural 
predicament. In this scenario roles were set out for a variety of players. These 
included line ministries, multinational companies, non-governmental 
organisations as well as farmer co-operatives and growers' associations willing 
to grow non-traditional export crops - a good foreign currency earner. 
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In the short case study that follows, three of these actors come together in a 
project oriented towards the production of plantain bananas. The first player in 
the project was TAPA, the growers association located in the Atlantic Zone, 
close to Panama's border. The second actor was MAG (the Ministry of 
Agriculture an Animal Husbandry), responsible for providing extension services 
to the 31 members of the growers association. And finally, Del Monte, a 
multinational company in charge of exporting and selling plantain bananas on 
the U.S. market. 
Initially, the goals of the three parties seemed to converge. TAPA could fetch 
high and stable prices for its bananas, and its members would be covered by 
insurance against flooding (a recurrent phenomenon in the region). MAG in turn 
would boast Costa Rica's first such export agreement and appoint one of its 
extensionists in situ. Del Monte, on its part, would profit from the lucrative 
export product without having to carry the operational risks involved. In addition 
to a convergence of interests, all parties coincided on the manner in which 
export-quality plantain bananas should be grown. Thus it was agreed that a 
comprehensive technological package involving drainage canals, a packing plant, 
biocides (i.e. nematicides, fungicides, herbicides, protective bags sprayed with 
insecticide), fertilisers, and so on would be gradually introduced. The parties 
agreed that the cost of the package would be born by the farmers themselves who 
in turn would be able to obtain the money to do so through a credit arrangement 
with the Costa Rican Development bank. 
Introducing the technological package, however, proved difficult and after a 
few initial shipments, export-quality plantains were not produced in significant 
quantities. Accusations as to whom or what was responsible for the project's 
failure abounded. MAG blamed Del Monte (which had no experience in the 
production of the crop) for trying to introduce a technological package based on 
the assumption that plantain bananas (essentially a smallholder crop) would react 
as well to increased technology and crop management as their banana cousins (a 
plantation crop). Del Monte on its part reproached MAG for the incompetence of 
its extensionist who seemed to be unable to convince farmers to properly adopt 
the proposed technological package. Also, the multinational accused farmers for 
their ignorance and non-entrepreneurial mentality. TAPA's board of directors in 
turn believed that the output decline was related to a general lack of 
responsibility among the associates, the absence of a strong feeling of group 
solidarity, and insufficient use of technological expertise in crop management. At 
the level of the farm however these simple accusations were challenged by a 
murky and complicated reality. As it turned out, the plots of TAPA's Black, 
Amerindian, and mestizo associates were very dissimilar, ranging from a quarter 
of a hectare to over 35 hectares. Crop intensity varied from 750 to over 3,000 
plants per hectare - with huge quality differentials in terms of soil composition 
and final output. Some associates appeared to have financial obligations with 
parties other than Del Monte (such as moneylenders): when in need they could 
not wait for the multinational's cheque to arrive and were compelled to sell their 
produce to local middlemen who competed with the multinational for the better 
banana specimens. The dynamics involving middlemen, moreover, was closely 
related to the initial agreement between Del Monte and TAPA, and meant that 
farmers would receive USD 7 for each 501b box delivered to the multinational. 
Each box could hold an average of 3 bunches of export-quality plantains, but 
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farmers soon realised (after the first shipment) that after the deduction of 
overheads, freight, handling and taxes the average price they obtained was just 
over USD 1.30 per bunch: a figure only slightly higher than the USD 1.10 paid 
for by local middlemen. Since middlemen punished farmers with price 
reductions of up to two-thirds the normal price when quality, size or ripeness 
were not optimal, many associates were inclined to sell their larger bunches of 
quality plantains to middlemen while selling the relatively smaller bunches to 
their own association. 
After some complex struggles and negotiations involving the three main actors 
as well as high-ranking politicians from the capital city of San José some major 
changes took place (cf. Verschoor, 1994). The multinational provided its own 
extensionist but now wished to have a contiguous area planted in bananas so that 
sigatoka (a fungus disease) could be controlled through aerial spraying by low-
flying aircraft. This meant that more associates needed to join TAPA, and MAG 
helped in this through all sorts of artifices - including blackmailing. Some 
changes took place at the level of the association as well. For example, a new 
packing system was introduced by which plantains were now packed on the 
associates' individual plots, and no longer in a common facility. (In order to 
make the new system operational, new dirt roads and small packing sites were 
constructed with the help of a donation from the Dutch Embassy). The new 
system entailed that individual associates would be personally responsible for 
cleaning, choosing and packing only the best plantains they produced. Through 
increased control, associates were henceforth monitored and individually 
penalised for low product quality as each box of plantains carried the owner's 
name. 
As the case suggests, the room for manoeuvre of the different actors involved 
changed throughout the project. Such disparate elements as plantain bananas, 
chemical compounds or politicians having no relationship with one another prior 
to the identification of the project, ended up being connected in increasingly 
compelling ways. In the end, some actors were able to control others. TAPA's 
Board, farmers and plantains could no longer close ranks with actors other than 
those explicitly allowed in the network assembled by MAG and Del Monte. 
Through a contract, farmers accepted the introduction of a technological package 
and a quality control system that diminished their capacity to make individual 
decisions. They could no longer sell to middlemen or be careless with plantain 
quality without risking penalties. Like the farmers, the plantains, too, were 
subject to export-quality demands and made to swell according to the guidelines 
of a multinational, which, for a time, borrowed the wills of others without fully 
owning the project. This case thus exemplifies the mobilisation of power - an 
issue I take up in the next section. 
Becoming infected by fieldwork: a risk worth taking 
The sequences of action portrayed in the short case studies above are rich in 
instances in which things progressively affect our main actors. In Mezquitân, 
Saturnino was entangled with objects, techniques, possibilities, and constraints. 
Mizticuil, chahuixtle, compadres, salvia, the sun, the moon, the rains, a tractor, a 
calendar, maize cobs, webs, work, ploughs, the soil, cows, tomato pickers and 
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Staturnino himself: they all infect each other so as to collectively arrange the 
details of that graceful and harmonious dance called agriculture. In Tolimân 
things were no different. There, León gained familiarity of consumer preferences 
through a painstaking learning process that includes judicious tinkering with both 
human and non-human elements such as ferments, agaves or innovative 
technologies. Likewise, in Costa Rica plantain bananas swelled to export-quality 
proportions when farmers closed ranks not only with extensionists, middlemen, 
and politicians but also with biocides, fertilisers, and management directives. 
Crucially, it would be a mistake to say that any one of the actors involved in 
these cases 'own' any of these stories: in their particular way, each of the actors 
can simultaneously be seen as 'owners' and 'owned'. 
What lesson should a development sociologist draw from this? If interested in 
testing assumptions, becoming infected by the object of study would not be a bad 
idea. Thus he would not try to determine either Saturnino's, Leon's or Del 
Monte's ontology by deciding, on his own, what their respective worlds are 
made of. Let us continue this line of thought with the example of Saturnino: if, to 
Saturnino, agriculture maps out a world in which people and things all play 
crucial roles, then our development sociologist should respect this - even if it 
contradicts his received (and cherished) notions about society or agriculture. 
Instead, he would need to question the standard categories of social scientists 
which have it that it is the humans that act, while the non-humans (the sun, the 
moon, the chahuixtle or the mizticuil) are merely passive objects. If he wants to 
understand the type of agriculture exercised by Saturnino in terms of Saturnino 
(as any actor-oriented sociology would propose) then the following passage 
might be of help: 
' We are never faced with objects or social relations, we are faced with chains which 
are associations of humans (H) and non-humans (NH). No one has ever seen a social 
relation by itself... nor a technical relation... Instead we are always faced by chains 
which look like this H-NH-H-NH-NH-NH-H-H-H-H-NH...' (Latour, 1991: 110) 
This is precisely the point were any actor-oriented approach bracketing the 
thinginess of the social goes awry. Of course, Anglo-Saxon sociology has heard 
of STS before, but it has misinterpreted the message by taking it as a proposal to 
grant agency to things. As Latour and others have been at pains to explain, the 
issue is not to grant agency to things, but to think of agency as a composition of 
forces: 
'It is by mistake, or unfairness, that our headlines read 'Manflies', 'Woman goes 
into space'. Flying is a property of the whole association of entities that includes 
airports and planes, launch pads and ticket counters. B-52s do not fly, the U.S. Air 
Force flies.' (Latour, 1999a: 182). 
In Saturnino's case this means that it would be incorrect to state that it is he who 
practices agriculture when this is in fact an activity jointly performed by an 
ensemble of elements {including, of course, Saturnino). This may be hard to 
grasp for anthropocentric science, but even if one sticks to the notion that it is 
Saturnino who practices agriculture, this in no way justifies leaving outside of 
the story those elements that enable Saturnino to carry out his activities in the 
first place. Such a silencing of reality reduces complexity and ironically 
contradicts the philosophy of Long's actor oriented approach. 
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Taking the entanglements between people and things seriously has 
implications not only for the notion of agency, but also for two other concepts 
that are central to Long's actor-oriented approach: knowledge and power. The 
case of León, for example, points at what is usually termed 'knowledge'. 
Contrary to so many accounts, 'knowledge' about consumer preferences is not 
gained by way of an invisible quantum leap that takes León from a state of sheer 
'ignorance' to a condition of 'knowledge'. The progressive and cumulative 
process of becoming knowledgeable about consumer preferences involves 
knowledge encounters at the interface between producers learning to be 
influenced by consumers (and vice-versa). This can in no way be understood 
without taking due account of the potentialities that bottles, stills, fermentation 
tanks or agaves offer León. Worse: no project or programme that aims to help 
producers (including those of mezcal) to enlarge their 'knowledge base' (and 
thus market share) will ever achieve its goal if knowledge is taken to be 
something that is confined to cognitive processes contained within producer's 
minds. Likewise, 'power' is not something that resides within a human (or, for 
that matter, a non-human). Power or force can only be understood by taking into 
account the complex fusion of people and things that together borrow their 
support and potency to specific projects of the happy few (and that, in turn, can 
neither be reduced to any one actor in particular). Take the case of plantain 
bananas, for instance. Farmers, dirt roads, extensionists, technological packages, 
politicians, Del Monte and plantain bananas all borrow their potencies to a 
project without a clear 'owner' and composed of an equally heterogeneous set of 
elements: Del Monte, extensionists, U.S. consumers, structural adjustment 
programmes but also plantain bananas and the farmers themselves. Power here 
becomes increasingly mixed up in the machinations of humans and the 
possibilities and constraints offered by things. Boundaries begin to blur as one 
delves deeper into the intricacies of the case, thus making it increasingly difficult 
to state that power is a property of individuals or groups. Not comprehending the 
distributed nature of power (or agency and knowledge for that matter) renders 
invisible the dynamics of social change and results - as the history of social 
science demonstrates - in redundant and tame explanations that are often cast in 
terms of essentialist oppositions (micro/macro, subject/object, agent/structure, 
free/determined, and so on) and that are incapable of making a difference. 
A few plain examples from Mexico and Costa Rica suffice to make one thing 
clear: the time in which development sociology could fabricate good science 
about social change without paying due attention to non-humans is forever gone. 
It would be unfair, however, to characterise the work of Long as being 
insensitive to this message which resonates the findings from STS. There may be 
many reasons for this, and one of them relates to what Clyde Mitchell once said 
during one of Long's Advanced Research Seminars, namely that 'to be a 
professor is a long slow slide to illiteracy'. Mitchell was anything but illiterate, 
but the point he was making was that it was a shame that our best brains end up 
losing so much time with petty administrative issues. Whatever the reasons: 
Long's first references to the work of the pioneers from STS date back a decade 
(Long, 1992), and STS authors were already compulsory reading in his 1989 
Research Seminars. It seems, however, that these references were used as 
rhetorical devices only, for they did not have a direct effect on the design of an 
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actor-oriented research programme. Long's most recent book (Long, 2001), 
though, seems more receptive to the proposition that actors are composite 
phenomena. 
The table is set for Long's approach to become 'infected' once again - not by 
Anglo-Saxon models of the actor, but by flesh-and-blood actors. There is nothing 
out there to stop this, and nobody needs to feel ashamed of showing an 
unreserved sensitivity and commitment towards the people we study: on the 
contrary, there is much pride to be gained in doing so. For too long, 
Development Sociology has been blinded by the social. Why not - like 
Saturnino, León, or Del Monte - take the entanglements between actors of a 
different genus in earnest? What would be against turning Development 
Sociology into the study of the heteio-genus, of materialities as well as 
socialities? Let us turn things on their head again, and become dangerous once 
more without fearing ridicule. Contrary to what Napoleon said, from the 
ridiculous to the sublime is only a step! 
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